1.Introduction
BRICS, born in the mid-2000s as an acronym for promising emerging markets, refers to an alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China, India, and South Africa that has expanded since 2024 to include new countries from the Global South, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE, and Indonesia. This expansion has led many to use the term "BRICS+" to signify the group's transformation from a limited club to a broader platform for rebalancing the international economic system.At the same time, the group's presence is expanding in macroeconomic figures; its members now represent about 45 percent of the world's population and between 35 and 40 percent of global GDP on a purchasing power parity basis, surpassing by some estimates the weight of the traditional G7 industrialized countries.
In this context, the question of the meaning of "expansion" is particularly important: are we facing a protest bloc that expresses the South's anger at the West's domination of financial and trade institutions and the dollar, or an actual alternative project that seeks to reshape the rules of the game itself? This moment also raises questions about the ability of BRICS+ to overcome the legacy of heterogeneity among its members, as it brings together democratic and authoritarian states, rentier and industrialized economies, and regional powers with sometimes intense rivalries between them.On the other hand, the expansion poses a challenge to the United States, the European Union, and Western institutions: does the bloc pose a serious threat to the status of the dollar and the instruments of political influence in the Global South, or is it merely a negotiating tool to raise demands?
2. The rise of BRICS+ from a protest bloc to a global economic powerhouse
BRICS originally emerged as a kind of "protest bloc" within the liberal system itself; the five founding members did not initially propose a revolutionary project to overturn globalization, but rather demanded a larger share in existing institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the G20, reflecting their growing demographic and economic weight.However, limited reforms within these institutions, and the concentration of voting and veto rights in the hands of Western powers, gradually turned the bloc into a platform for expressing broader dissatisfaction in the global South with the structure of the post-Cold War order. As debt crises in African and Latin American countries worsened and criticism of the conditionality of austerity programs grew, BRICS came to capture a cross-regional sense that the financial "rules of the game" were designed to ensure continued Western centralization even in times of economic distress (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024).
Expansion has accelerated since the Johannesburg Summit in 2023, when the group invited six new countries to join, before Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE became full members in early 2024, followed by Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia was formalized in 2025, while partnerships are being opened to a wider range of candidate countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.This acceleration cannot be separated from three interrelated factors:First, the erosion of the confidence of many developing economies in the ability of the Bretton Woods institutions to respond to their development needs in light of climate, debt and supply chain crises; second, the increased use of financial sanctions after 2014, up to the freezing of Russia's reserves and forcing many countries to take sides in major conflicts, which deepened the feeling that the dollar has become a geopolitical tool, not just a neutral currency; and third, the search by several regimes for a political and economic umbrella that reduces their vulnerability to US and European pressures, without having to break completely with the West.
With the addition of major oil and gas producers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, BRICS+ controls nearly a third of global oil production, a significant proportion of gas exports, and strategic food commodities such as wheat, rice, and soybeans, in addition to representing between 45 and 56 percent of the world's population depending on how the new partnerships are calculated, and 35 to 44 percent of global output on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis.
But the fundamental question is how this quantitative weight can be transformed into qualitative tools that reshape the structure of the system? Here, the role of the organs and institutions that BRICS has been building for years, headed by the New Development Bank, which finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects in member countries and beyond, with a loan portfolio of more than $40 billion distributed over more than 100 projects, with an increasing trend towards lending in local currencies to reduce exchange rate risks and dependence on the dollar.Countries have also established reserve financial arrangements to complement the roles of the IMF, and national clearinghouses in China, Russia, India, and Brazil are developing alternative payment systems to SWIFT and promoting the use of local currencies in trade settlements, especially in energy and raw materials trade, as part of a broader strategy to "de-dollarize" and reduce the vulnerability of their economies to Western sanctions (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024; Council on Foreign Relations, 2025).
The size of the New Development Bank, while growing, is still modest compared to institutions such as the World Bank or regional development banks, and trade settlement initiatives in local currencies are still concentrated in specific sectors and pairs, and have yet to produce an integrated financial network comparable to Western infrastructures.As for the idea of a "common currency," which has received wide media attention, most experts treat it as a far-reaching idea, and some even consider it a symbolic tool for negotiating pressure rather than a viable project in light of the divergent monetary and trade policies among members, which is confirmed by recent economic analyses that argue that expanding membership increases the difficulty of achieving real monetary convergence.
The rise of massive artificial intelligence models and their need for massive electrical power, rare metals and cloud infrastructure is redefining the power equation in the global economy. BRICS+ countries collectively hold a large share of the reserves of cobalt, lithium and critical metals needed for the energy transition, as well as huge internal markets capable of absorbing investments in data and connectivity, as well as huge internal markets capable of absorbing investments in data and connectivity.Some members of the bloc, such as China, India, and Brazil, are developing ambitious national strategies in green and digital technologies, opening up the possibility of envisioning "alternative value chains" led by Southern powers rather than exclusively Western economies (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024).
3. Domestic Challenges - Big Bloc or Mosaic of Interests?
If the first axis highlights the rise of BRICS+ as a potential material power, the second axis reveals the other side of the picture: a complex mosaic of interests and rivalries that may prevent the economic and demographic weight from turning into a coherent political pole. The alliance brings together very different powers in terms of geographical location, political regimes, and strategic priorities.It is enough to look at the strained relationship between China and India to realize the depth of these differences; the two countries are engaged in chronic border disputes, compete for influence in the Indo-Pacific, and adopt different visions towards the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and alliances with the West.While both see BRICS as a platform to expand their margin of maneuver vis-à-vis the United States, New Delhi, for example, is keen on its membership in arrangements such as the "Quad" with Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra, making it reluctant to turn the bloc into an anti-Western axis led by Beijing (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024).
Regional rivalries are also intertwined in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, where Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Ethiopia join the bloc with acute conflict files over regional balance, waterways, and security issues. The Iranian-Saudi conflict, despite the recent cooling process, still carries the potential for a relapse in the issues of regional influence, energy, and maritime security.The dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam and the sharing of Nile waters puts two BRICS+ countries on opposite sides of an existential issue that is difficult to envision resolving within a loose economic framework.While Moscow sees BRICS as a tool to break Western isolation, other countries, such as India, Brazil, and South Africa, are keen to avoid being drawn into an explicitly Russian axis and are trying to use the bloc as a mediation or balancing platform rather than a military-political alliance (Le Monde, 2025; European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024).
There are relatively liberal market economies such as Brazil, South Africa, and India; command economies with a strong state presence such as China, Russia, and Ethiopia; and rentier economies that depend to varying degrees on oil and gas exports such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE.This diversity may be a source of strength in terms of complementarity in resources and markets, but it is also difficult to envision the adoption of coordinated monetary and fiscal policies similar to what exists in the European Union, and makes the discussion of a "common currency" closer to a symbolic aspiration than a realistic project, especially in light of the different levels of inflation, central bank independence, and exchange rate regimes among the members.China, for example, focuses on deepening industrial and technological value chains, while oil-rich countries have relatively slow economic diversification strategies, and African economies are looking for urgent solutions to debt and basic infrastructure crises (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024).
These differences are reflected in the governance structure within BRICS+. The bloc does not yet have supranational institutions capable of imposing binding commitments, but rather operates through consensus mechanisms, summits, and ministerial meetings, with a large margin for national maneuvering. This pattern provides flexibility that attracts countries reluctant to surrender sovereignty, but limits the bloc's ability to take unified positions on sensitive issues or implement large-scale joint projects in a limited time frame.Despite its symbolic and practical importance, the New Development Bank's investment decisions are still highly dependent on the calculations of the contributing governments and move at a much slower pace than the needs of countries facing severe debt and climate crises, as indicated by several analyses of the limited operational capacity of emerging Southern institutions compared to their established Western counterparts (New Development Bank, 2025; Reuters, 2025; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024).The absence of a strong general secretariat, a joint parliament, or formalized dispute resolution mechanisms leaves many issues hostage to personal understandings between leaders, a pattern of governance that has proven limited in previous international blocs.
While some BRICS+ countries present themselves as defenders of "southern sovereignty" in the face of Western interference, they simultaneously practice controversial domestic policies in the areas of human rights and political freedoms, which weakens their ability to build a convincing moral narrative to their peoples and the world.Part of the bloc is economically dependent on fossil fuel exports, while others have more ambitious carbon-neutral goals, which is reflected in divergent positions during climate negotiations at the United Nations or the World Trade Organization (WTO).These gaps in vision make it difficult for BRICS+ to present itself as a coherent alternative to the liberal governance model, and push towards a hybrid formula in which the slogans of international justice coexist with the persistence of narrow national interests (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024).
4.Western Reaction - Serious Threat or Exaggeration?
The expansion of the BRICS+ has sparked a wide debate in Western capitals about the seriousness of the threat it poses to the hegemonic formula that has been in place since the end of the Cold War.In American and European rhetoric, three central concerns emerge:First, the potential erosion of the dollar's status as a global reserve currency if the "de-risking" and "de-dollarization" effortsadopted by some bloc countries, especially in energy and metals trade; second, the fear of losing accumulated political influence in the global South if developing countries find alternative sources of financing and investment from the IMF, the World Bank and Western markets; and third, the concern that the crystallization of a broad bloc that brings together powers such as China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia and Iran will accelerate the transition to a multipolar world in which the West's ability to impose its security and economic agendas will become more limited.Reports by Western think tanks express these concerns by emphasizing that BRICS+ is not just a "discussion club" but a potential platform for re-engineering the rules of trade, energy, and finance (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024).
On the other hand, a significant part of Western analysis tends to doubt the ability of BRICS+ to become a real alternative, based on a number of arguments. The first of these arguments is the heterogeneity of the members, as mentioned above, which makes it difficult to build unified positions on complex issues such as IMF reform, debt restructuring, or setting rules for technological competition.The second argument relates to the absence of a supranational institution to coordinate policies and override internal political calculations, unlike what exists in the European Union, for example; each BRICS+ member retains wide margins to make bilateral agreements with Washington, Brussels, or Tokyo outside the bloc's frameworks.The third argument is that a number of the new members are still highly dependent on Western investment, technology and financial markets, making a break with the West, or even adopting sharply escalating policies against it, too costly from the perspective of their ruling elites (House of Commons Library, 2024; European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024).
At the strategic level, Washington continues to build networks of security and political alliances in the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance the rise of China, specifically through arrangements such as the Quad and OCOS, while deepening defense and technology partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India.The United States and the European Union are also seeking to introduce alternative infrastructure financing initiatives in the Global South, such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, in an attempt to compete with the attractiveness of Chinese financing and New Development Bank projects. In parallel, Western capitals are expanding their economic and political engagement with the Gulf states, Africa, and Latin America to ensure that these regions do not turn into exclusive spheres of influence for China and Russia under the BRICS (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024).
At the financial level, the instruments of Western hegemony remain strong; the dollar and euro dominate central bank reserves and global trade transactions, and payment networks such as SWIFT and global card companies are still the main settlement infrastructures.In the near term, therefore, Western strategies focus on "managing" de-dollarization efforts rather than preventing them entirely; that is, reducing the use of indiscriminate financial sanctions that fuel the search for alternatives, and developing channels of cooperation with some BRICS+ members on climate, debt, and artificial intelligence, reducing their incentives to fully align themselves with a parallel camp.Western capitals are also betting on the continued attractiveness of their financial, technological and university markets and the ability of their multinational companies to impose their standards in global value chains, factors that make it difficult for most southern countries to disengage from the West even if their options expand.
On the one hand, it is undeniable that the bloc has become a real "counterweight," allowing developing countries to negotiate from a stronger position with the IMF, energy companies, and major countries, and giving China, Russia, and India additional platforms to present alternative narratives to liberal hegemony.On the other hand, the image of a "complete replacement" for the West seems exaggerated in the short term; the financial, legal and technological institutions that the West has established over decades still have a depth that is not matched by what the bloc has built so far, and part of the BRICS+ countries prefer to use multipolarity to increase their room for maneuver rather than to replace one axis with another.Therefore, many analysts tend to see BRICS+ as a complementary player in the process of establishing gradual multipolarity, rather than a radical break with the existing international order (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024; House of Commons Library, 2024).
5.Conclusion
A reading of the BRICS+ expansion reveals a fundamental paradox: the bloc combines a growing material weight in population, resources, and output with an internal and institutional structure that is still fragile by the standards that the West has established in its financial and trade institutions.The first axis showed how the group moved from the position of a "protest bloc" to trying to build alternative tools in financing and trade settlements, motivated by the erosion of trust in Western institutions and the escalation of the use of sanctions, while the second axis showed that regional rivalries, different economic models and the absence of effective supranational institutions limit the ability of the bloc to turn into a coordinated pole. The third axis highlighted that the West, although it does not see the BRICS Plus as a complete alternative in the near term, has come to treat it as a player that cannot be ignored in redrawing the map of influence in the global south.
In light of this, it can be said that the future of BRICS+ will depend on three interrelated factors: the ability of the members to manage their internal contradictions and build a minimum level of cohesion; their success in developing financing and payment institutions that offer practical and attractive terms to developing countries; and their skill in attracting more members and partners without losing the bloc's flexibility.BRICS+ is not the end of the current world order, but it marks the beginning of a new phase of redistribution of influence, where the dominance of one pole declines in favor of a more complex pluralism in power centers and globalization rules.
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