Introduction:
In the last decade, the decisive role of traditional centrist political parties in Europe has begun to diminish, to be replaced by wider areas of political restriction and the rise of extremist and populist currents. National elections in several countries have witnessed a significant decline in support for traditional parties (constitutional left and traditional right) in favor of new or extreme parties, whether on the nationalist right or radical left. This change is linked to a growing sense of public disillusionment with prevailing economic and social policies, and growing security and political concerns. Since 2022, Europe has faced major economic shocks represented by record inflation caused bythe
For example, in 2025, the Greens and Socialists coalition in France lost its leading position in the polls against a record growth in support for the far-right National Rally party. In Germany (February 2025), the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) lost its leading position in the polls.In Germany (February 2025), the SPDstumbledto its lowest level since World War II at 16.5%, while support for the AfDrose to20.5%, representing a major shift in the traditional vote distribution.Spain's parliamentary elections (July 2023) presented a similar picture of a split vote. The traditional right-wing PPcame out on topwith 33.1%, while the far-right Vox gained 12.4%, and the result of a hung parliament resulted in a fragile government. In Poland, the 2023 elections reshaped the map: a broad coalition between center and left parties (30.7%+14.4%+8.4%).(30.7%+14.4%+8.6%=53.7%) versus 35.4% for the nationalist Law and Justice Party, resulting in a multi-party coalition facing strong opposition from far-right forces. This diverse convergence of votes highlights a common phenomenon: the decline of major parties under the weight of structural crises, and the rise of new or radical forces.
First: Economic factors and their impact
Europe went through an unprecedented inflationary crisis after 2021, with the inflation rate in the Eurozone reaching a peak of 10.6% in October 2022 as a result of rising energy and food prices. Although inflation gradually declined to around 2% by 2025, the impact of the shock remained present in the consciousness of the weaker classes as a real decline in purchasing power and the erosion of economic gains.Reports have reflected the breadth of real household losses, with ECB research indicating that around 70% of households suffered real losses due to the 2021-2022 inflation wave, with the most vulnerable and those on fixed incomes, especially the elderly, among the hardest hit.With the growing discontent over the cost of living, a general view has been reinforced that traditional economic policy tools, such as fiscal tightening or monetary restriction, are no longer sufficient to manage shocks, especially in light of the sensitivity of public opinion towards socially costly structural reforms. In this climate, populist forces found a ready opportunity to reframe anger into political discourse against the elite, with short-term promises such as protecting the minimum standard of living and defending national industry, which increased their appeal to affected voters.
The European Commission's projections for fall 2025 reflect modest European GDP growth of 1.3-1.4% per year until 2027, which means a continued slowdown in activity and the high cost of political waiting for governments. This slowdown makes every government required to deliver quick results in an environment that does not easily allow for this, and multiplies the impact of crises on political legitimacy.The dilemma is clearly visible in the case of Germany, where export fluctuations overlapped with the industrial decline, while press coverage indicated that the largest economy in Europe is going through a phase of suffering and that companies are having difficulty seizing global market opportunities in light of the political class's preoccupation with other pressing issues, thus the relative stagnation becomes not only an economic figure, but an engine of political tension that weakens the ability of the center to market progressive policies to a public that wants an immediate remedy.
In Italy, budget austerity policies were associated with a relative improvement in investor confidence and a reduction in the deficit from 8.1% in 2022 to 3% in 2025, but this was accompanied by weak growth indicators and a notable industrial decline, reflecting the paradox of stability without growth as a logic that improves fiscal perception but does not reproduce social satisfaction.In Spain, unglossy growth indicators intertwined with social anxiety related to economic uncertainty, in a political context that showed high sensitivity to investment and consumption. Despite a relative improvement in the labor market, inflationary pressures and a slow industrial recovery continued to weaken citizens' confidence, making the economy here a direct gateway to redrawing the political map, not just a backdrop.
At a broader level, the impact is not limited to macro indicators, but extends to the erosion of confidence in the social model itself. By mid-2020, segments of the middle class and workers increasingly felt that the social contract that Europe boasted of no longer guaranteed tangible protection from shocks, making them more willing to believe the promises of those who offer immediate gains such as expanding subsidies or radically reducing taxes, even if the long-term cost is higher.In this sense, economic pressures act as a constant pulling force from the center of moderation: they weaken the appeal of incremental solutions, open a political vacuum for those who present themselves as a revolutionary alternative, and redefine politics as a race for rapid response rather than consensus-building.
Second: Security factors and their impact
The Russian-Ukrainian confrontation constituted the biggest security shock to Europe in decades, not only because it brought the war back to the heart of the continent, but also because of its direct political and economic repercussions. The mutual sanctions contributed to deepening the energy and food crises, and raised the level of security concerns, especially on the eastern borders of the European Union, where fear of military escalation overlapped with fears of reconfiguring long-term geopolitical contact lines.In this context, European reports indicate an escalation of internal security threats, as 58 terrorist attacks were reported in 14 European countries during 2024, more than half of which resulted in injuries, in parallel with the recording of 449 arrests related to terrorism cases, which reflects the expansion of the scope of the threat rather than its decline.
This general sense of insecurity, whether related to terrorism or the transformation of regional crises in Europe's southern and eastern neighbors such as Syria and Libya, has reinforced among large segments of the electorate more stringent demands regarding security and border protection. In this climate, populist parties found in the security issue an effective mobilization tool. Far-right forces promoted external threat theories related to irregular migration or cross-border terrorism, while other forces played on the chord of restoring order and imposing state authority, offering themselves as an assertive alternative to centrist governments that seemed reluctant or slow to respond.
This security dimension directly intersects with the migration crisis, which has not abated for more than a decade. In 2023, about 1,050,000 migrants applied for asylum within the European Union, before the numbers dropped in 2024 to about 912,000 applications, a decrease of 13%, but this does not mean that the crisis has actually abated.October 2023 recorded a remarkable peak of 115,000 asylum applications in one month. The influx of refugees from Ukraine, Africa and Asia affected the policies of several countries, whether in terms of absorption capacities or internal political discourse. There was an intense debate over the distribution of responsibilities among member states and the distinction between organized and irregular migration, while centrist governments tried to pass new consensual frameworks such as the European Migration Pact.
On the other hand, populist movements escalated their rhetoric using slogans such as closing borders and repatriation contracts, presenting these policies as a defense of the economy and national identity. This tension was evident in Eastern Europe, where countries such as Poland welcomed Ukrainian refugees for their positive humanitarian and political impact, but remained very reserved about regional redistribution policies for refugees coming from Syria and Libya, reflecting a security-political selectivity in dealing with the refugee issue.In rural areas and marginalized sectors within a number of countries, increased migration has contributed to strengthening the presence of right-wing populist parties, especially those that have linked migrant flows to pressures on welfare systems and public services.
In general, the intertwining of security pressures with the migration and terrorism crises has contributed to the conviction of a growing proportion of citizens that traditional political systems are no longer able to protect them. With headlines such as the government has failed to stop crime or the state has lost control of the borders, a populist discourse that presents itself as the security guardian of society has strengthened, quietly threatening the foundations of the centrist political system in Europe.
Third: Examples of European political realities
In Germany, the parliamentary elections held in February 2025 showed the extent of the crack in the historical consensus in Europe's largest economy. The two large traditional parties continued their sharp decline, with the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian ally dropping to 28.5% compared to 32.9% in 2021, while the Social Democratic Party recorded only 16.4%, its lowest level since the nineteenth century.In contrast, the far-right Alternative for Germany party rose to second place with 20.This imbalance of power forced the two major parties to form a broad coalition to secure a fragile majority in parliament, which observers described as a weak coalition that faces difficulty in managing a slowing economy and a divided society, amid mounting security and migration pressures. As the populist right focused on criticizing immigration and urban development policies, the erosion of the political center was evident as a gateway to an authoritarian vacuum attracted by new forces.
Since the National Assembly elections in June 2022, President Emmanuel Macron's party has lost its absolute majority for the first time since 1997, leading to a minority government saddled with political compromises.By the fall of 2025, opinion polls revealed that the popularity of the president's party had fallen to less than 6%, while the right-wing National Rally had risen to about 22% of voting intentions, while the rest of the center and traditional left parties lost a large part of their bases. This scene reflects a sharp tripartite division in French society, amid a deep crisis of confidence in political parties, where public confidence in them does not exceed 10%, leaving the moderate center in a fragile position and unable to impose its agenda without weak forced alliances.
In Italy, a different paradox emerges between political stability and economic suffocation. Despite a long history of government instability, the right-wing nationalist coalition led by Giorgia Meloni has managed to achieve relative continuity since 2022, supported by a wide parliamentary majority and growing popularity. However, this stability masks deep economic dilemmas, from declining industrial production to weak investment and the lowest growth among advanced European economies. Analysts point out that the government, despite its parliamentary strength, lacks real economic ambition, and the Italian economy's dependence on European support makes any shake-up in this support.
The parliamentary elections in July 2023 resulted in the reproduction of a leftist government with the support of regional parties, but with a weaker support base than in 2019. The People's Party (PP), the traditional right-wing representative, received 33.The People'sParty, the traditionalright-wing party, received 33.1% of the vote, while the far-right Vox party received 12.4%, while the left-wing government coalition collected only 31.7%.This fragile balance made government formation dependent on delicate and shaky alliances and opened the door to repeated possibilities of political paralysis or a return to early elections.
Political analysis has shown that these results were not simply a reflection of a fleeting electoral moment, but rather an expression of a deeper crisis in the left-wing center's ability to maintain a stable consensus. The left's losses in local elections in 2023 prompted the decision to hold early elections, but at the same time revealed a remarkable paradox: the survival of a unified Social-Democratic coalition despite the rise of the far right.However, the current government's reliance on the support of disparate regional parties, and the continued rise of Vox with subversive populist rhetoric, made the government's position vulnerable, especially as the Vox leadership announced its readiness to ally with the People's Party to form a strong right-wing alternative, which brought fears of a far-right government scenario back to the forefront of public debate.
In Poland, the October 2023 elections marked a turning point that effectively ended the dominance of the nationalist Law and Justice Party (PiS) since 2015. The center-left opposition coalitions managed to win a parliamentary majority of about 53.7%, compared to 35.4% for the PiS, with an additional presence of the far right represented by the Confederation Party. Although the PiS remained the largest single bloc, the election results forced the presidency, close to it, to accept the transfer of power to the opposition camp.
This shift reflects the end of the bipolar model that has governed Polish politics for years, and ushers in a new phase based on broad and complex coalitions that require constant coordination between disparate forces. In this context, the role of the Polish street, especially in major cities, emerged as a decisive factor in favoring centrist democratic forces against populist nationalist discourse. Voters expressed a clear desire for a smooth transition to a more stable Europe, which represented a direct political message against the isolationist and escalatory policies pursued by the Law and Justice Party, and contributed to undermining its influence at the national level.
Fourth: Future Paths and Recommendations
The accumulated economic, social and security crises have narrowed the margin of maneuver for the traditional political center in Europe and emptied its rhetoric of persuasiveness, while hardline forces have stepped forward with the promise of radical and rapid solutions, even at the expense of institutional cohesion. The question is no longer whether the "guaranteed ally" will regain its position, but to what extent the bleeding of votes to the edges of the political spectrum can be stopped.
On the one hand, centrist parties need to propose bold economic and social reforms that directly affect the living reality, such as wage policies, supporting the affected sectors, and building a new industrial policy that restores the middle class. On the other hand, the issue of security and migration requires a rational and transparent dialogue that balances between protecting borders and respecting human values, rather than leaving the scene to fearful and polarizing rhetoric.
Strengthening European governance and coordination between member states remains a central factor in facing cross-border crises, from energy and inflation to security and migration, giving citizens a greater sense of control and stability. In conclusion, populism may not disappear quickly from the European scene, but it will lose its momentum when the center proves its ability to absorb social anger and transform it into realistic and implementable policies. Failure to do so may indeed mean the end of the idea of a "guaranteed ally" in European political consciousness, and the beginning of a long phase of uncertainty and polarization.
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